Date: Tuesday, 13 October 2026
Today (13 October), Security Council members will hold closed consultations on the situation in the Horn of Africa. The US requested the meeting in light of the escalation in northern Ethiopia. Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO) Martin Kimani is expected to brief.
This will be the second time in the last two weeks that Council members have discussed recent developments in northern Ethiopia. At France’s request, members held closed consultation on 30 September on the Horn of Africa, during which Kimani briefed.
Fighting in northern Ethiopia escalated in late September after the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) formed an alliance with six other armed groups called “the Alliance for Survival coalition”. The group is seeking to oust Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and, on 23 September, it said it was engaged in a “defensive war”. The fighting marks the most serious escalation of violence in the area since the 2020-2022 war between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia, which also saw Eritrea fighting alongside the Ethiopian government forces. Although no official figures have been released, the estimated death toll from that conflict stands at about 600,000. The two-year war also triggered a humanitarian crisis and was marked by allegations of widespread violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict.
The recent eruption of violence followed months of simmering tensions, with some analysts linking the escalation to the incomplete implementation of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement signed by the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, which was brokered by the African Union (AU). Although that agreement halted active fighting and created a framework for disarmament, provisions that would have promoted a political settlement of the dispute have not been fulfilled.
In early August, intense clashes between the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and the TPLF were reported in Shererina, near the border with Sudan, with each side accusing the other of instigating the violence. Later that month, several drone strikes targeted Mekelle (Tigray’s capital), with local officials blaming the ENDF for the attacks.
On 22 September, the ENDF reportedly carried out airstrikes, including with drones, that hit five schools in Tigray. On the following day (23 September), the TPLF took over three airports in the cities of Mekelle, Axum, and Shire in the region. In a 25 September statement, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk expressed alarm at the effects of the escalating fighting on civilians. Among other things, he deplored the TPLF’s “ongoing campaign of forced mass recruitment of civilians, including children” as well as “incidents of killing, torture, arbitrary detention, forced displacement, and other reprisals targeting those who resist recruitment”.
Following a counter-offensive launched by the ENDF, the Alliance for Survival coalition announced its withdrawal from Mekelle on 3 October, and government-allied forces entered the city. Pro-government forces have since reported further advances, including in the Tigray towns of Idaga Hamus, Abiy Adi, and Adigrat.
On 23 September, AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf requested AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa Olusegun Obasanjo—who had also led the mediation efforts that produced the Pretoria Agreement—to support renewed diplomatic efforts. Subsequently, on 26 September, during a consultative meeting of the UN-AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security, both organisations “expressed concern” over the heightened tensions in northern Ethiopia. During Security Council members’ 30 September closed consultations, Kimani apparently recommended that the issue be discussed at the 20th annual joint consultative meeting between members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), to be held on 23 October, but it does not appear that this issue will be included on the agenda.
It seems that Council members are increasingly concerned about the interstate dimension of the recent escalation. Although Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopian government forces during the 2020-2022 war, the relationship between the countries has since deteriorated and both sides have sent letters to the Council in the past week conveying their respective narratives. In a 9 October letter (S/2026/797), Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos accused Eritrea of deploying mechanised and infantry units into Ethiopian territory and of arming, financing, and directing insurgent groups. He also invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, informing the Council that Ethiopia is taking measures against Eritrea in exercise of its inherent right of self-defence.
In a 10 October response letter (S/2026/798), Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh rejected the self-defence claim as an attempt to justify a war of aggression and accused Ethiopia of seeking to forcibly acquire “sovereign access to the sea”. In the letter, he cited a 27 September statement by Ethiopia’s Deputy Chief of Staff, General Abebaw Tadesse, that Mekelle was a “stop-over” towards invading Eritrea. Saleh asked the Council to condemn Ethiopia’s “declaration of war” and take deterrent measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.
Eritrea severed diplomatic ties with Ethiopia on 1 October, after Ethiopia expelled ten Eritrean diplomats and closed its embassy in Asmara. On 4 October, leaders of Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia met and adopted the El Alamein Joint Declaration, affirming that Red Sea governance is the exclusive responsibility of littoral states. On 5 October, as he was sworn in for another five-year term, Abiy reiterated that landlocked Ethiopia must have access to the Red Sea and be included in discussions on Red Sea security. The AU Commission has called on Ethiopia, Eritrea, as well as Egypt to exercise maximum restraint.
At tomorrow’s meeting, Kimani may echo points from the 9 October statement by Secretary-General António Guterres, in which he said that he was gravely concerned by the renewed fighting in Tigray, Afar, and Amhara; called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a return to dialogue under the Pretoria Agreement; and expressed concern at reports of Eritrean forces in Ethiopia. He reminded states of their Charter obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force and offered his good offices. Kimani might also reference the Algiers Agreement that ended hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000. In a December 2025 statement marking the 25th anniversary of that agreement, Guterres urged the two countries to recommit to the vision of lasting peace and the “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity embodied” in the agreement. Kimani may reiterate such messages tomorrow.
Council members are likely to echo recent public statements. For instance, the UK rejected the Alliance for Survival coalition’s “stated aim to overthrow Ethiopia’s government” and France and other European members condemned the attacks by the alliance and expressed support for a credible path towards the easing of tensions. The US Department of State said that the conflict jeopardises US cooperation with Ethiopia and Eritrea, and on 5 October US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos urged both countries to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to exercise maximum restraint. Russia, for its part, called on parties to observe a ceasefire and called on external actors to refrain from interfering in Ethiopia’s internal affairs.
More broadly, members are likely to express alarm at the risk of regional conflagration, call on all sides to de-escalate, and stress the need to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity and to pursue dialogue. Several members may seek further information on the reports of Eritrean troop presence in Ethiopia and the nature of Ethiopia’s self-defence measures. Members may also raise questions about the humanitarian situation. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has highlighted continued uncertainty over access and insecurity along conflict front lines.
Members may differ on the Council’s role in addressing the crisis. Some may prefer to leave the matter to the AU and the Pretoria framework, while others may favour stronger Council engagement. Members advocating for greater Council involvement may express support for a product such as a press statement.
During the 2020-2022 war, different positions on the situation in the Council made it difficult for members to agree on a formal product addressing developments in Tigray. They were able to issue only two press statement, in April and November 2021, calling for unfettered humanitarian access and reaffirming “their strong commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of Ethiopia”.
