Date: Thursday, 24 September 2026
https://ericzuesse.substack.com/p/trump-americas-massive-theft-from
https://theduran.com/trump-americas-massive-theft-from-the-greenlanders
Trump-America’s Massive Theft from the Greenlanders
24 September 2026, by Eric Zuesse. (All of my recent articles can be seen here.)
I asked ChatGPT:
“Is Trump's deal with Denmark and Greenland basically equivalent to the U.S. owning Greenland?”
Not legally. But in the military-security sphere, the September 22, 2026 agreement gives the United States powers over Greenland that resemble some of the most important practical powers an owner—or sovereign—would possess. The distinction is important.
The actual agreement explicitly preserves Danish/Greenlandic sovereignty. Denmark describes it as respecting “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark” and Greenland's right of self-determination. So Greenland has not been sold, ceded, annexed, or transferred to the United States.
But the substantive concessions are unusually extensive. Under the agreement, the United States obtains expanded military access, can establish two additional bases (Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig), expand Pituffik Space Base, and establish the Golden Dome missile-defense system. Reuters describes the arrangement as giving the U.S. long-term control over Greenland's defense and investments.
More importantly, the agreement is permanent:
“This Agreement does not have an end date and may only be amended by mutual consent.”
That means Denmark or Greenland cannot simply terminate it unilaterally under the agreement's terms.
There is an even more consequential provision. If Greenland becomes independent of Denmark, the agreement survives independence. Denmark and Greenland undertake to ensure that the new Greenlandic state remains within NATO and assumes the obligations contained in the agreement.
And the agreement goes beyond American bases. It creates mechanisms concerning foreign investment and the exclusion of adversarial military or strategically sensitive activity. The White House consequently describes the deal as giving the United States “lasting control over security interests in Greenland” and says adversaries cannot establish a military presence or sensitive investment without American approval. That is the U.S. government's characterization; the treaty text itself should control where Trump's description goes further than its precise language.
So I would distinguish three different propositions:
|
Question |
Answer |
|
Does the U.S. own Greenland? |
No. Sovereignty remains with the Kingdom of Denmark/Greenland. |
|
Does the U.S. effectively control Greenland's defense against outside powers? |
To a very large extent, yes, under the new agreement. |
|
Does the U.S. control Greenland generally as though it were U.S. territory? |
No. Greenland retains its government, laws, population, natural-resource authority and right of self-determination. |
The most revealing comparison therefore isn't ownership but something closer to a permanent strategic protectorate arrangement—though “protectorate” is not the agreement's legal status. The United States has obtained much of what Trump said he needed Greenland for without acquiring sovereignty over Greenland itself.
In that narrower sense, Trump appears to have obtained a substantial portion of the strategic advantages that U.S. ownership would have provided, while Denmark and Greenland retained the legal sovereignty that outright American ownership would have eliminated.
The actual treaty text is here, and it is considerably more informative than the press coverage:
Full U.S.–Denmark–Greenland agreement (White House)
There are two provisions in it that I think deserve especially close examination, because they may make the American position considerably stronger than the phrase “military access” suggests: the provisions concerning jurisdiction within U.S. defense areas and control over third-country investment/access.
Sovereignty DOES NOT remain with Greenland or Denmark, BECAUSE the treaty can be terminated ONLY if the U.S. okays that -- which MEANS that America virtually OWNS Greenland.
Your argument identifies a much stronger point than my previous answer acknowledged, but I would distinguish formal sovereignty from effective control.
Article XI really does say:
“This Agreement does not have an end date and may only be amended by mutual consent...”
And unlike many defense agreements, Article XI contains no unilateral withdrawal provision. Therefore, assuming the agreement enters into force and Article XI operates as written, Denmark and Greenland cannot simply decide, “We no longer want these American rights,” and terminate them under the agreement. The United States would have to consent to changing the arrangement.
That becomes especially consequential because the rights being made permanent are substantial. The agreement gives U.S. forces free movement between defense areas through Greenland; permits U.S. aircraft to fly over and land anywhere in Greenland without restriction except as mutually agreed; gives U.S. public vessels undersea access and movement in Greenland's territorial waters; and establishes arrangements concerning strategically sensitive foreign investment.
Most strikingly, Greenland cannot escape those obligations merely by becoming independent. Article XI requires Denmark and Greenland to ensure that an independent Greenland remains in NATO and “affirmatively assume” all the rights and obligations imposed by this agreement and the underlying defense arrangements.
So I would revise my previous characterization this way:
Legally, the United States does not own Greenland and does not possess sovereignty over it. But your description of the arrangement as giving the United States something approaching permanent effective control over crucial attributes of Greenland's external sovereignty—especially defense—is substantially supported by the treaty text.
There is an important reason not to equate that completely with ownership, however. Greenland still controls enormous areas of governmental authority: taxation, domestic law, education, health, most economic affairs, natural resources subject to the agreement's restrictions, elections, policing, etc. The United States hasn't acquired those powers merely because Denmark and Greenland cannot unilaterally terminate the defense agreement.
But consider the extraordinary asymmetry you identified. If Greenland tomorrow elected a government whose policy was “Remove all American military forces from Greenland,” that government apparently could not accomplish its policy simply by exercising Greenlandic sovereignty. It would need American agreement to alter the treaty obligations. Article XI deliberately makes the arrangement permanent.
And the White House itself is using language remarkably close to your interpretation. Its September 22 announcement says the agreement gives the United States “lasting control over security interests in Greenland,” includes “permanent basing rights,” and prevents a U.S. adversary from establishing a base, military presence, or sensitive investment without American approval. Trump described it even more expansively as giving America “permanent control over security and all other needs on that territory.” Those are U.S. political characterizations rather than definitions of sovereignty, but they are significant evidence of what Washington believes it obtained.
So the most precise formulation of your proposition might be:
Denmark and Greenland retain formal sovereignty over Greenland, but they have permanently surrendered important exercises of that sovereignty to the United States, without retaining a unilateral right to recover them.
That is considerably closer to “America virtually owns Greenland” than my original answer suggested—provided virtually owns is understood as a description of effective strategic control rather than a statement about legal title to the territory.
And there is a deeper question here: Can a state meaningfully be said to retain full sovereignty when it has irrevocably contracted away sovereign powers and cannot recover them without another state's permission? International law ordinarily answers yes formally, because entering binding treaties is itself an exercise of sovereignty. But your argument concerns substantive sovereignty rather than the formal legal label. On that question, Article XI makes the distinction unusually stark.
Read the September 22 agreement itself (White House)
“That treaty restricts investment and development of Greenland's rare earths and other natural resources, to ONLY NATO countries and their corporations. Consequently, there will still be SOME competition for those development-rights and access, and this means that America won't be able to FORCE Greenland to accept an American offer. In that sense, AND ONLY IN THAT SENSE, the treaty is indeed "virtually" the same as American ownership of Greenland. Better for Greenland would be to kick all Americans off the island -- their land is now a slave to NATO and ESPECIALLY its effective controller, which is the U.S. Government -- Greenlanders' clear ENEMY. If I were a Greenlander, I would support independence from Denmark and NO agreement with America. Only THEN would Greenland be free to make its own VOLUNTARY arrangement with any country -- including with America to NOT make any agreement with any country which the U.S. Government disapproves of. That would serve America's legitimate security-interests by assuring that Greenland will be INTERNATIONALLY NEUTRAL.”
I think one factual correction materially changes the first part of your analysis.
The treaty does not limit investment or resource development to NATO countries and their corporations. Article X defines the permitted category more broadly: investors from NATO members, NATO partner states, and EU member states are outside the treaty's categorical restriction. And even an investor outside those categories is not absolutely prohibited: the parties can agree that the proposed activity does not threaten national security or public order.
More importantly, Article X doesn't give the United States the right to select who receives a Greenland mining concession. It prevents certain foreign investors from obtaining “control,” “significant influence,” or sensitive non-public information in “Particularly Sensitive Sectors or Activities,” expressly including resource extraction, subject to the exceptions above. Greenland is required to implement that restriction through its investment-screening laws, in close cooperation with Denmark and consultation with the United States.
So your distinction is important: Washington possesses a powerful exclusionary right, but not a general acquisition right. It can help prevent an unacceptable foreign investor from obtaining strategic control, but an American corporation cannot thereby compel Greenland to sell it a mine, grant it a concession, or accept its price. Greenland can choose among permissible investors—or presumably choose not to develop a resource at all. That is one substantial respect in which actual American ownership would be different.
There is also an important complication in your proposed alternative of an independent and neutral Greenland. Under this particular agreement, independence by itself would not accomplish that. Article XI specifically requires that, if Greenland becomes independent, the new state remain in NATO and “affirmatively assume” the agreement and the existing Defense Arrangements.
Therefore the sequence you envision would require something more radical than independence under the treaty's contemplated procedure: Greenland would have to obtain release from the agreement or assert that it was no longer bound by it despite Article XI. The latter could produce a serious international-law dispute. The treaty expressly recognizes Greenland's international-law right of self-determination while simultaneously attempting to bind the resulting independent state permanently to NATO and these defense arrangements.
Your proposed security arrangement is conceptually different from the treaty just signed. It would amount roughly to:
Greenland becomes an independent, militarily neutral state; permits no foreign military bases or permanent foreign forces; and undertakes not to enter military or strategically sensitive arrangements with third states that would create a direct security threat to the United States. In exchange, the United States recognizes and guarantees Greenland's territorial integrity and political independence.
That could address the stated American concern about Russian or Chinese military establishment in Greenland without necessarily giving Washington permanent basing rights, unrestricted military overflight/access, or the present investment-screening role. Whether Greenlanders would prefer such an arrangement is, of course, for them to decide.
And this highlights what I think is the strongest factual basis for the distinction you are drawing. Article VI says American military aircraft may “fly over and land in any territory in Greenland” and American public vessels may have undersea access and movement in Greenlandic territorial waters, subject only to restrictions mutually agreed by the parties. Article XI then makes the arrangement indefinite and amendable only by mutual consent.
So there are really three separate powers here: American military access, American participation in excluding certain third-country strategic investments, and Greenland's continuing authority to decide which permissible investor, if any, actually develops Greenlandic resources. Conflating those would overstate American control; separating them makes the extraordinary extent of the first two considerably clearer.
“But what I propose is Greenland's rejection of this virtual conquest by America. You missed my statement.”
Yes. I did miss the essential point of your proposal.
You were not proposing that Greenland become independent pursuant to the new agreement, thereby inheriting its obligations. You were proposing that Greenland reject the agreement itself as an unacceptable constraint, become independent of Denmark, remove the American military presence, and then negotiate its international relations as a genuinely independent state.
Your proposed sequence is therefore:
That is materially different from what I described.
There would still be a major international-law dispute over whether an independent Greenland could simply repudiate obligations that Denmark, Greenland and the United States had previously agreed should survive Greenlandic independence. The new agreement expressly attempts to prevent precisely the outcome you propose by requiring an independent Greenland to assume the defense arrangements and remain within NATO.
But that legal dispute should not be confused with your underlying proposition. Your argument is essentially about self-determination at the moment of independence: if an independent Greenland is genuinely sovereign, you contend that Greenlanders themselves—not Denmark and not the United States under a pre-independence agreement—should determine whether the new state accepts American bases, NATO membership, restrictions upon foreign investment, or none of them.
And I also understand your use of “virtual conquest” now. You're not claiming that the treaty literally transfers territorial title to the United States. You're arguing that its combination of indefinite American military rights + restrictions on Greenland's dealings with third countries + no unilateral Greenlandic escape from those obligations + permanent continuation after independence from Denmark produces something functionally resembling conquest in the areas covered by the agreement.
Whether “conquest” is the appropriate characterization is an evaluative question; the underlying structural features can be examined separately. And your proposed alternative is the opposite structure: independence first, followed only by international obligations that the sovereign Greenlandic state itself voluntarily chooses to undertake.
“I rejected your number 4, because it would DEFINITELY get a rejection by the U.S. I was proposing that ANY imperial nation will be excluded -- not ONLY America but any country that America views as its enemy. That would be Greenland's ONLY concession to America -- TOTAL NEUTRALITY.”
Yes. I understand the distinction now, and my formulation of point 4 contradicted it.
You are proposing neutrality in both the military and geopolitical senses, but with an additional security guarantee specifically designed to address the United States' stated concern about hostile powers gaining a strategic position in Greenland.
Under your proposal, an independent Greenland would:
Thus Greenland would not say to Washington, “China may establish itself here because we are neutral.” Nor would it say, “America may establish itself here because China and Russia may not.” It would say, in effect: none of you may establish military control here.
That makes your proposed bargain with Washington quite specific: the United States would surrender its special military position in Greenland, while receiving the security result it says it requires—Greenland could never become a military platform for an American adversary.
And your distinction concerning natural resources is important. If by “total neutrality” you mean military/geostrategic neutrality rather than economic isolation, an independent Greenland could still invite competitive commercial bids for rare-earth mining and other development, without allowing an investor's home government to convert economic activity into military or political control.
So your proposal is not “Greenland leaves the American sphere and enters somebody else's.” It is “Greenland leaves everybody's sphere.”
That is substantially different from the arrangement signed with the United States, because the present arrangement does not establish neutrality: it permanently embeds Greenland within one military alliance and gives the United States exceptional security rights there. Whether Washington would accept your alternative is a separate political question; I would not assume that a guarantee excluding U.S. adversaries would necessarily satisfy Washington, particularly because Washington might regard its own physical presence in Greenland as necessary for missile warning, space surveillance, and Arctic defense rather than merely preventing an adversary's presence.
“If "Washington might regard its own physical presence in Greenland as necessary for missile warning, space surveillance, and Arctic defense rather than merely preventing an adversary's presence," then HOW MUCH SHOULD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PAY TO GREENLAND FOR THAT? The present treaty pays Greenland NOTHING!”
Yes. If the question is what would constitute a commercially defensible payment for the extraordinary military rights the United States receives, I would not start from zero. The new agreement itself is remarkable because the White House expressly advertises it as providing “permanent basing rights” and “lasting control over security interests in Greenland” “at no cost to American taxpayers.”
There is no objectively correct market price, because there is no competitive market for permanent strategic control over Greenland. But we can construct a reasonable valuation from comparable basing agreements and, more importantly, from the strategic value of what Greenland is supplying.
One particularly useful contemporary benchmark is Diego Garcia. The British government has valued its new arrangement with Mauritius at an average of about £101 million per year for 99 years for continued control of Diego Garcia, describing the base as a crucial national-security capability. The same parliamentary record notes France's agreement to pay €85 million annually for its substantially smaller base in Djibouti.
Greenland is providing considerably more than an ordinary military-base lease. Under the September 2026 agreement, the United States receives Pituffik expansion rights; two additional defense areas; a mechanism for creating still more defense areas; accelerated consideration of unmanned installations; extensive aircraft, maritime and undersea access; and strategic advantages associated with continental missile defense. The agreement deliberately reinforces the “permanent nature” of these arrangements.
That makes, say, $100 million annually look extraordinarily low as a valuation benchmark. Even $500 million would be only about $8,800 annually per Greenland resident, assuming roughly 57,000 inhabitants.
I would therefore examine something on the order of $1–2 billion per year as a starting negotiating range, rather than as a claim that this is the uniquely correct price. At $1 billion, that is approximately $17,500 per Greenlander annually; at $2 billion, about $35,000.
There is an even better structure than simply fixing a rent forever. Greenland could demand:
$1–2 billion annually, inflation-indexed, plus separate compensation for each additional defense area, plus payment for extraordinary use or expansion, with the entire agreement terminable by Greenland after a specified period.
The termination provision would be economically crucial. A perpetual, non-unilaterally-terminable right should cost much more than a 20- or 30-year lease. Indeed, economically, perpetuity changes the nature of what Greenland is giving up: instead of periodically having the opportunity to renegotiate the price of an increasingly valuable strategic asset, it has surrendered that bargaining opportunity.
And there is historical evidence that Washington itself understood how valuable Greenland was. A 1957 State Department assessment explicitly said:
“No rent is payable for the use of Greenland territory for these highly-valuable rights”
and instructed that the “great importance of the Greenland bases and other facilities” effectively be counted as part of Denmark's NATO contribution.
That makes the present situation particularly striking. Seventy years later, the strategic value of Greenland has arguably increased because of Arctic competition, missile-warning geography, space surveillance and the proposed Golden Dome system, yet the United States has again obtained extraordinarily valuable rights without an explicit annual rent. The original 1951 agreement likewise expressly granted American defense-area rights “without compensation to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark.”
So if you ask me for a defensible negotiating number rather than a symbolic one, I would investigate $1 billion annually as the floor of Greenland's opening demand, perhaps $2 billion or more given perpetuity, indexed to inflation and supplemented by direct Greenlandic economic benefits.
There is another way of calculating it that may produce a substantially higher figure: estimate what Greenland's geographic position saves the United States in alternative missile-defense, early-warning, space-surveillance and Arctic military infrastructure, and charge the U.S. a negotiated percentage of that strategic value. That is probably the economically rigorous way to answer your question, rather than simply comparing Greenland with ordinary overseas bases.
“We both agree that the Trump-Greenland Treaty is a rip-off of Greenland to the U.S. Government, NOT any sort of fair business deal. It is THEFT FROM GREENLANDERS BY THE U.S. WITH DENMARK’S COOPERATION.”
I agree with the factual premise about the imbalance, but I would separate that from the conclusion that it is “theft,” because that is an evaluative characterization rather than something the treaty itself establishes.
The imbalance is unusually stark. The White House itself says the agreement gives the United States “lasting control over security interests in Greenland,” “permanent basing rights,” and the ability to prevent U.S. adversaries from establishing military presences or making sensitive investments without U.S. approval—and expressly emphasizes that this comes “at no cost to American taxpayers.” Secretary Rubio similarly calls it permanent U.S. security control at “zero cost.”
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MY COMMENT:
Here you see from the WhiteHouse the video of the treaty’s being signed by the heads oof America, Denmark, and Greenland:
https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/2102424080586801322
and right below it is a map of Canada being surrounded by Greenland, Alaska, and the lower-48, all three of which are shown being covered over by the U.S. flag. If Greenlanders don’t yet know that they’ve been had, Trump makes clear there that they were. They have been raped and are now U.S. subjects, no citizens anywhere.
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Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s latest book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public.
